The paper examines representative cases of ``dishonest'''' voting. In all but one case the claim that ``strategic voting'''' is ``dishonest'''' is refuted. In all cases the effects of ``misrepresentation'''' need never harm any majority. Indeed majorities may benefit from ``strategy'''' (in non-cycle cases too). In fact democracy demands ``strategy''''. Although the universal value of the choice set is disputed even in the one recalcitrant case, the result is, after all, an element in the ``honest'''' choice set.

The paper examines representative cases of ``dishonest'' voting. In all but one case the claim that ``strategic voting'' is ``dishonest'' is refuted. In all cases the effects of ``misrepresentation'' need never harm any majority. Indeed majorities may benefit from ``strategy'' (in non-cycle cases too). In fact democracy demands ``strategy''. Although the universal value of the choice set is disputed even in the one recalcitrant case, the result is, after all, an element in the ``honest'' choice set.

Voters satisfy maximin or maximax in their choices between sets of alternatives and secure a Pareto improvement by all voting strategically under simple majority voting for particular sincere preferences. Thus the assumption that strategic voting is a bad thing is challenged and the idea that we should reject voting because of the possibility of misrepresentation dismissed.

Impossibility theorems for 2-person and majority continuous games on the unit circle are presented. The emphasis is on simple methods, albeit generating new results, to offer insights into the sophisticated results of theorists in topological social choice.